Six experiments tested the hypothesis that the mirror effect in recognition memory reflects a deliberate, postretrieval assessment of the test item's memorability. Both word frequency and concreteness were varied, and constraints at retrieval were manipulated in 2 ways: Three experiments compared recognition tested either alone or while performing a secondary task, and 3 experiments used the response-signal method to control recognition processing time. Contrary to the hypothesis, the mirror effect was not eliminated or attenuated by either kind of retrieval constraint. Moreover, both retrieval manipulations induced mirror effects of their own. Current recognition-memory theories appear inadequate to explain the results. It is suggested that the mirror effect be related to the full range of patterns of hits and false alarms, and that these 2 measures routinely be supplemented by measures of discriminability and bias.
Variables that influence recognition memory commonly have opposite effects on the proportions of hits and of false alarms. That is, if subjects are more likely to call a studied item old in Condition A than in Condition B, they tend to be less likely to call a distractor item old in Condition A than in Condition B. This interaction between condition and memory status has been called the "mirror effect" (see Glanzer & Adams, 1985 , 1990 . The best known examples of the mirror effect are those attributable to item variables, such as the natural-language frequency and concreteness of words: Lowfrequency (LF) words typically produce higher hit rates and lower false-alarm rates than do high-frequency (HF) words, and concrete words typically give higher hit rates and lower false-alarm rates than do abstract words (Glanzer & Adams, 1985 , 1990 . However, manipulations producing the mirror effect also include subject variables such as age (Backman, 1991) and controlled variables such as presentation rate (Ratcliff, Sheu, & Gronlund, 1992) and recency (Glanzer, Adams, & Iverson, 1991) .
In one sense, the mirror effect may seem intuitively obvious because a manipulation that makes it easier to remember which items are old should make it easier to tell which items are new. However, the effect has been difficult for recognitionmemory theorists to explain. To see why, consider that nearly all current models cast recognition memory in signal-detection terms, as a discrimination that is based on a single criterion on a unidimensional strength or familiarity scale (e.g., Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; Hintzman, 1988; Humphreys, Bain, & Pike, 1989; Murdock, 1982; Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1992) . Account-ing for the mirror effect, in this approach, requires explaining why the positions of the distributions on the scale are ordered: new A < new B < old B < old A (Glanzer & Adams, 1985 , 1990 . The problem lies in understanding why studying items of Types A and B should invert their relative positions on the familiarity scale.
Can familiarity-based memory models be modified to explain the inverted order? One approach has been what could be called a two-factor model: One factor determines the ordering of new A and new B, whereas another factor determines the ordering of old A and old B. For example, both Hintzman (1988) and Hoshino (1991) have proposed that new HF words are more familiar than new LF words, but that LF words are better encoded during study. If the encoding advantage of LF over HF words is strong enough to reverse the initial familiarity difference, a mirror effect is obtained. In essence, such an account treats the mirror effect as a coincidence, and it does not readily generalize to other manipulations that yield mirror effects. It does, however, have the advantage of not being constrained to always predict a mirror effect. As Hoshino's data show, mirror effects do not always occur.
A second approach has been to rescale familiarity, transforming it to a new scale on which the old and new A and B distributions have the required order. Gillund and Shiffrin (1984) proposed that subjects do something akin to z-score rescaling by estimating means and standard deviations of the appropriate distributions. Glanzer and Adams (1990) proposed that familiarities are transformed to log likelihood ratios. More recently, Hintzman (1994) proposed that a subject could estimate a test item's learnability by learning it on the test trial and could then use this estimate to rescale the item's original value on the familiarity scale. We say more about these rescaling models in the General Discussion section.
Before theorists commit themselves to a two-factor modification of familiarity theory, add a rescaling component, or try some more radical new approach, another possibility needs to be considered. Recognition decisions could be based on familiarity, essentially as the models propose, and the mirror effect could reflect an optional, postretrieval reassessment of familiarity that is based on the test item's judged memorability. Brown, Lewis, & Monk (1977) provided evidence for such a view. After studying lists of names, subjects were given test lists that included their own names as a distractor. Subjects did not commit false alarms to their own names. Likewise, subjects who had studied a list of the names of cities and towns did not make false alarms to the names of their own hometowns. On the basis of these findings, Brown et al. (1977) argued that the mirror effect reflects the subject's judgment of the memorability of the test item:
The results support the view that a negative recognition decision is influenced by judged memorability If the subject judges the item concerned to be of high memorability, the absence of a positive memory constitutes stronger evidence against that item than if he judges it to be of low memorability, (p. 470) This argument focuses on the false-alarm rate of the better remembered category of items. That is, the interaction between A versus B and new versus old is assumed to reflect suppression of false alarms to the A items on the basis of the metamemorial judgment that-because they are so memorable-their low experimental familiarity is inconsistent with the hypothesis that they were in the study list.
At the end of their article, Brown et al. (1977) raised several questions, including two with which we are particularly interested here: First, "Is memorability always taken into account consciously, or can it be a rapid covert process, like so many of our cognitive activities?" Second, "Does the effect of memorability disappear when a recognition decision must be taken very quickly?" (pp. 472-473) . We reasoned that, if the mirror effect is attributable to a metamemorial judgment of the kind suggested by Brown et al. (1977) , then it should require conscious reflection, which should in turn require appreciable deliberation time. The experiments reported here concerned the roles of conscious attention and retrieval time in producing the mirror effect.
Overview of the Experiments
Two experimental paradigms were used to investigate these questions. One paradigm-based on a method pioneered by Craik (1982) and used more recently by Jacoby (1991)-compares recognition test performance under dual-task and single-task conditions. The dual task is assumed to divide attention, thereby reducing the role of conscious judgments in recognition decisions and revealing the effects of more automatic processes (Jacoby, 1991) . To the extent that the mirror effect reflects conscious, metamemorial judgments, testing recognition under dual-task conditions should make the mirror effect disappear.
The second paradigm uses the response-signal method of studying retrieval dynamics (e.g., Dosher, 1984b; Reed, 1973 Reed, , 1976 . In this method, subjects are trained to respond immediately on hearing a signal, and the lag from onset of the test item to onset of the response signal is varied. The increase in recognition accuracy over a retrieval episode can be traced out as a function of lag, or processing time. If the mirror effect is caused by postretrieval reflection on the test item's memorability, then it should appear only late in the retrieval episode. In both experimental paradigms, the difference between constrained and unconstrained retrieval should show up primarily in false-alarm rates. That is, the probability of saying "old" to a new A item should be less than that to a new B item only in the single-task recognition condition and only at relatively long response-signal lags.
The divided-attention paradigm was applied separately to the effect of word frequency in Experiment 1 and to the effect of concreteness in Experiment 2 using word sets used previously by Glanzer and Adams (1990) . The response-signal method was applied, using the same materials, in Experiments 3 and 4. We then developed a new, larger word set that allowed examination of the effects of frequency and concreteness using the same subjects. These materials were used with the dividedattention paradigm in Experiment 5 and with the responsesignal paradigm in Experiment 6.
An additional methodological consideration concerned definition and measurement. The mirror effect is routinely discussed as though it were a categorical outcome defined strictly by the rank orderings of the rates of hits and of false alarms (Glanzer & Adams, 1985 , 1990 . Such a definition is sensitive only to the directions, not to the magnitudes of differences. It will sometimes categorize much different outcomes as the same and sometimes treat highly similar outcomes as different. Figure 1 illustrates this point using four hypothetical data sets. The first set depicts what can be called a prototypical mirror effect, in which old and new responses occur equally often, and the A-B difference in hits mirrors exactly the difference in false alarms. In the second set, old responses occur much less often in Condition B than in Condition A; nevertheless, the directions of differences conform to the description of the mirror effect. The third and fourth sets are numerically almost identical, yet one (Set 3) displays a mirror effect and the other (Set 4) does not. (Demanding statistical reliability of differences in both hits and false alarms does not solve this problem because statistical reliability is likewise a categorical decision.)
Our concern about the mirror effect's categorical, or noncontinuous, definition is reinforced by the fact that the pattern was by no means universal in the studies surveyed earlier by Glanzer and Adams (1985) . In their Tables 1 through 5, 5.5% of the word-frequency data sets, 23.5% of the concreteness or imageability data sets, 31.2% of the meaningfulness or familiarity data sets, 25% of the pictures versus words data sets, and 42.6% of the "miscellaneous other variables" data sets failed to show a mirror effect. (Statistical reliability of differences in hits and false alarms between A and B was not required for a study to be classified as showing a mirror effect, but a difference in d' was required for the study to be included in the survey.) Recent investigations suggest that the mirror effect may be best interpreted within the larger context of such failures. For example, Hoshino (1991) found the usual difference in d' between HF and LF words. However, a mirror effect emerged only when lexical decision was used as the encoding task; otherwise, both the hit and false-alarm rates were greater for HF words than for LF words.
As a way of dealing with this problem, we suggest that hit and false-alarm rates be supplemented by measures of both discriminability and bias. In this research, we measured discriminability using d L (the logistic d') and computed bias The standard categorical definition of the mirror effect hides similarities and differences that are captured by measures of discriminability and bias such as logistic <f (d L ) and logistic bias (C L ). Set 1: A prototypical mirror effect. Set 2: A much different pattern that also meets the mirror effect definition. Sets 3 and 4: Two highly similar patterns, one that meets and one that does not meet the definition of the mirror effect. FA = false alarms; H = hits; P = probability. using the associated bias measure, C L > Application of these two measures to recognition memory was discussed by Snodgrass and Corwin (1988) . d L is essentially linear on d' except when either hit rate (H) or false-alarm rate (FA) is close to 0 or 1, and d L may be transformed into d' using the approximation, d' s 0.6 d L . C L indicates the overall balance between old and new responses. This measure is zero for a condition when H = 1 -FA, which occurs when the response criterion is placed where corresponding old and new distributions cross. C L is negative when H > 1 -FA (liberal bias) and positive when H < 1 -FA (conservative bias). In principle C L is unbounded, but in practice it seldom strays outside of the range of -2 to 2.
As Figure 1 shows, the prototypical mirror-effect pattern (Set 1) is earmarked by a difference between A and B only in discriminability, not in bias. The differences among the mirroreffect patterns seen in Sets 1, 2, and 3 are well captured by differences in bias, as is the similarity of Sets 3 and 4. A fruitful way to think about the mirror effect may be to ask why, and under what conditions, a large A-B difference in discriminability is accompanied by little or no difference in bias.
Experiment 1
In this experiment we examined the effects of divided attention on the mirror effect for HF and LF words learned in the context of a lexical decision task. In the test phase, subjects made old-new decisions on individual test words under conditions of either divided attention (dual task) or undivided attention (single task). In the dual-task condition, they performed the recognition test while simultaneously monitoring a string of auditory digits for runs of three consecutive odd digits (Craik, 1982; Jacoby, 1991) .
Method
Subjects. Twenty University of Oregon students, all native speakers of English, served for credit in undergraduate psychology courses. They were tested individually in 1-hr sessions. The data for 2 subjects were dropped because recognition performance was near zero or negative.
Procedure. Each subject completed three cycles through the experimental procedure: a practice cycle, in which the recognition test was combined with the digit-monitoring task, to accustom subjects to the dual-task condition, and two experimental cycles, one single task and one dual task. In each cycle, a lexical decision list (the study phase) was followed by a recognition-memory test list. Half of the subjects had a dual-task recognition test in the first experimental cycle and a single-task recognition test in the second, and the other half of the subjects had the two conditions in the reverse order. In the single-task condition, subjects performed the recognition task by itself. In the dual-task condition, they performed the recognition task while listening to a long series of digits, occurring at a rate of two every 3 s. They were to respond to each series of three consecutive odd digits by saying "now" aloud. Subjects were told, prior to each study list, whether it would be followed by a single-task or a dual-task recognition test.
In the lexical decision phase of each cycle, words and pronounceable nonwords were presented visually, one at a time, on a computer screen. The subjects were instructed to press a key with the right index finger for words and another key with the left index finger for nonwords. Instructions emphasized both accuracy and speed, and each stimulus remained on the screen for 2,000 ms with an interstimulus interval of 500 ms; thus, exposure duration was not affected by the latency of the lexical decision.
Recognition tests were also presented by computer. Equal numbers of new words and old words (from the preceding lexical decision list) were shown in random order, and subjects were instructed to press a key with the right index finger if the test word was old or another key with the right ring finger if the test word was new. Subjects were told to respond on the basis of first impression and to be as quick and as accurate as possible. Each word remained on the screen until the subject responded, and the next test item then appeared after a 500-ms delay.
For the practice cycle, the lexical decision list included 20 words and 20 pronounceable nonwords, and the recognition test included the 20 old words and 20 new words. For each experimental cycle, the lexical decision list included 102 words and 102 pronounceable nonwords, and the recognition test list consisted of 100 old words and 100 new words.
Design and materials. Experimental words were taken from sets of HF and LF words used previously by Glanzer and Adams (1990) .
2 The mean Kucera and Francis (1967) frequencies of the HF and LF lists were 156.2 and 9.2, respectively, and the two word sets were matched on mean rated concreteness and on mean word length. The only descriptive statistic we examined for these two variables on which the two word sets were not matched was word-length skewness, which was highly positive for HF words, but negative for LF words. A total of 180 HF and 180 LF words from this pool were subdivided into four equivalent sets, denoted Sets A, B, C, and D. Each set consisted of 45 HF and 45 LF words. Half of the subjects saw Set A in the first nonpractice lexical decision list and Set C in the second, whereas the other half of the subjects saw Set B in the first list and Set D in the second. One set of 90 pronounceable nonwords was used in both versions of the first list, and another set of 90 was used in both versions of the second list.
In each experimental lexical decision list, 12 words appeared among List Positions 1-12 and 193-204 and thus served as primacy and recency buffers. The 90 experimental words (from Sets A-D) appeared among Positions 13-192. In each recognition test list, the first 20 words were treated as practice items. Ten were old words, taken from the primacy and recency buffers of the presentation lists, and 10 were new. The remaining 180 words were evenly divided among old HF, new HF, old LF, and new LF words. The two recognition test lists were formed by combining the words from Sets A and B for one list and the words from Sets C and D for the other list. Thus, the words that were new for half of the subjects were old for the other half of the subjects. The two versions of each presentation list were crossed with the two attention conditions in such a way that each word served equally often in each cell of a 2 (dual-task vs. single-task) x 2 (old word vs. new word) design.
The lexical decision and recognition tasks were presented visually on a Macintosh computer using PsychLab software (Gum & Bub, 1988) . A standard keyboard was used to collect subjects' responses on both the lexical decision and recognition tasks. Responses in the secondary listening task were recorded manually by the experimenter.
The stimuli for the listening task consisted of 43 target sequences of three consecutive odd numbers, appearing within a list of 224 digits. A minimum of 1 and a maximum of 5 digits separated target sequences. No more than 2 even digits or 3 odd digits (the target size) ever occurred consecutively. The total number of digits and targets presented to each subject depended on the speed of the subject's recognition decisions; slower subjects heard more digits. If more than 224 digits were required, the digit list was started over again without interruption. Stimuli for the listening task were tape-recorded in a male voice at a rate of 1 digit per 1,500 ms.
Results and Discussion
Mean hit rates and false-alarm rates for both the dual-task and single-task control conditions are shown in Table 1 . Differences in both hit rates and false-alarm rates to HF and LF words were in the direction of a mirror effect, but the difference in hit rates was small. A 2 (single vs. dual task) x 2 (HF vs. LF) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the hit rates revealed an advantage of the single-task condition over the dual-task condition, F(l, 17) = 14.18, MS e = .007,/? < .001, but neither the main effect of frequency nor the Frequency x Task interaction was significant (both Fs < 1). False-alarm rates, by contrast, showed only an effect of word frequency, F(l, 17) = 34.78, MS e = .007,p < .001. The dual versus single task produced neither a reliable main effect, F(l, 17) = 1.06, MS t = .008, nor a significant interaction with word frequency, F{\, 17) = 2.98, MS C = .003. The significance level of pairwise comparisons on word frequency, as determined by t tests, is indicated by the footnotes in the table.
To avoid undefined values of d^ and C/., hit rates and false-alarm rates were adjusted by adding 0.5 to observed frequencies and dividing by N + 1, as recommended by Snodgrass and Corwin (1988) . Means and standard deviations of d L and C L are shown in the bottom half of Table 1 . An ANOVA on d L revealed significant effects of dual versus single task, F(l, 17) = 15.15, MS e = 0.13, and word frequency, F(l, 17) = 22.42, MS e = 0.18, ps < .001. The Task x Frequency interaction was not significant, F(l, 17) = 1.22, MS e = 0.05. A similar ANOVA on C L showed a higher bias for LF than for HF words, F(l, 17) = 14.26, MS e = 0.15, p < .002, reflecting the differential effect of word frequency on hits and false alarms. Divided attention produced no reliable main effect or interaction involving C L .
A simple index of the influence of divided attention on the word-frequency effect is the ratio,
The larger the effect of frequency on recognition accuracy, the lower this ratio should be. Conversely, a manipulation that reduces both d L (HF) and d L (LF) in the same proportion will leave this ratio unchanged. Although this ratio can fluctuate widely if based on a small number of observations, and is therefore too erratic to compute for individual subjects, it can be computed from the means shown in Table 1 . The ratios were .66 and .64 in the single-task and dual-task conditions, respectively, which is consistent with the hypothesis that divided attention did not influence the word-frequency effect.
This experiment showed effects on discriminability of both word frequency and divided attention. There was, however, no evidence for the prediction that divided attention would attenuate the word-frequency effect. Strictly speaking, word frequency produced a mirror effect, but it did not conform to the prototypical pattern because there was a large HF-LF difference in bias. The effect of divided attention itself was more consistent with the prototypical mirror pattern, in that divided attention produced a reliable difference in discriminability but no reliable difference in bias.
Experiment 2
In this experiment we examined the effect of divided attention on the mirror effect attributable to word concreteness.
Method
Twenty subjects volunteered for credit in psychology courses at the University of Oregon. The procedure and design were identical to those of Experiment 1, except that the materials differed: Concreteness was manipulated instead of word frequency. The words again came from those used by Glanzer and Adams (1990) . There were 180 abstract words and 180 concrete words. On a scale ranging from 1 (abstract) to 7 (concrete), the concrete words had a mean rating of 6.87, and the abstract words had a mean rating of 2.38. The two sets of words were equated for mean Thorndike and Lorge (1944) frequency and for mean word length. The frequencies and lengths of the two word sets were well matched on all descriptive statistics except word-length skewness, which was positive for the concrete words but negative for the abstract words.
Results
The data are shown in Table 2 . Hit rates were reliably affected only by single versus dual task, F(l, 19) = 14.18, MS e = .007, p < .001. Neither the effect of concreteness (F < 1) nor its interaction with task, F{\, 19) = 3.16, MS e = .004, was reliable. False-alarm rates showed an effect of single versus dual task, F(l, 19) = 62.79, MS t = .005, p < .001, a borderline effect of concreteness, F(l, 19) = 4.43, MS t = .023, p = .049, and a significant Concreteness x Task interaction, F(l, 19) = 8.13, MS, = M5,p < .05.
Analysis of d L showed a reliable effect of single versus dual task,F(l, 19) = 22.24,M5 e = 0.92,/? < .001, a reliable effect of Table 2 ). C L revealed a higher (more conservative) bias for concrete words than for abstract words, F(l, 19) = 29.36, MS e = O.U,p < .001, and a reliable Concreteness x Attention interaction, F(l, 19) = 10.72, M5 e = 0.10, p < .01. The main effect of-divided versus undivided attention was not reliable. The ratio, d L (abstract)/d L (concrete), was nearly identical in the single-task (.66) and dual-task (.70) conditions, suggesting that divided attention did not influence the effect of concreteness on recognition accuracy.
Discussion of Experiments 1 and 2
The materials manipulations of Experiments 1 and 2 had similar effects. In both experiments, differences in d L were found under both dual-task and single-task conditions, and the d L ratios in dual-task and single-task conditions were about the same. Word frequency and concreteness also had significant effects on bias. C L was higher for HF than for LF words in Experiment 1 and higher for abstract than for concrete words in Experiment 2. The net effect, in both experiments, was that the mirror pattern showed up strongly in false alarms but was not apparent in hits. The experiments were also consistent in showing a mirror effect attributable to divided attention: False alarms increased and hit rates went down when recognition was accompanied by the listening task.
If the mirror effect were attributable to a deliberate, postretrieval judgment of memorability, then one would expect the ratio of d L values to be closer to unity under dual-task than under single-task conditions because the secondary task presumably occupies some of the attentional capacity required to make the judgment. The ratio differed little, if at all, between single-and dual-task conditions in both experiments. More specifically, however, the memorability hypothesis suggests that the modulating effect of divided attention should fall on false alarms rather than hits, because false alarms to the most memorable items are supposed to be suppressed (Brown et al., 1977) . Here, the data appear to be more favorable to the hypothesis. The HF versus LF difference in false alarms was reduced by the dual task in Experiment 1, and the concreteness difference in false alarms was eliminated in Experiment 2. Such positive evidence is diluted, however, by the failure to find an effect of divided attention on the d L ratio or on C L .
A problem in drawing strong conclusions about the role of conscious attention from the dual-task methodology of Experiments 1 and 2 is that subjects could switch attention back and forth between the recognition task and the listening task, devoting full attention to the recognition of some words and guessing on others. Given such a strategy, the memorability hypothesis would not necessarily predict elimination of effects of frequency or concreteness by a secondary task. In Experiments 3 and 4, therefore, we controlled the time allowed for each recognition decision rather than combining recognition with a secondary task.
Experiment 3
In the response-signal method (e.g., Dosher, 1984b; Gronlund & Ratcliff, 1989; Reed, 1973 Reed, , 1976 , a test item is presented and the subject is allowed a variable amount of time (the lag) before being given a signal that demands an immediate manual recognition response of old or new. If the mirror effect results from conscious reflection on the memorability of the test item, the effect should appear only late in the retrieval episode. Moreover, if the effect reflects suppression of false alarms to more memorable items, then false alarms, not hits, should show the delayed effect. In Experiment 3 we manipulated word frequency and used response-signal lags of 175, 450, and 750 ms.
Method
Subjects. Twenty undergraduates at the University of Oregon participated in the experiment. They received $5 for a single 1-hr session.
Design and materials. The stimulus words were the same 180 HF and 180 LF words from Glanzer and Adams (1990) that were used in Experiment 1. Each presentation list consisted of 15 HF and 15 LF words, and the corresponding test list consisted of these 30 old words intermixed with 15 HF and 15 LF new words. All words were sampled randomly without replacement from the original Glanzer and Adams (1990) pool. Five words from each of the four conditions (HF/ LF x Old/New) were tested with response signals occurring at each of three lags: 175, 450, and 750 ms. The orderings of items in the presentation lists were random. Test lists were divided into five blocks of 12, with each condition (HF/LF x Old/New x 3 Lags) occurring once per block in random order.
Procedure. During the experimental session, nine presentation test cycles were administered, the first three for practice. Stimulus presentation, timing, and response collection were performed on a Macintosh computer using Toolbox calls to achieve fast stimulus display and millisecond timing according to the method outlined by Rensink (1990) .
Subjects were first told that they would be shown a list of words that they were to learn and that they would then be tested on a series of words to which they were to respond either old or new with respect to the preceding list. The two response keys were demonstrated, and subjects were instructed that shortly after each probe word appeared on the screen they would be signaled simultaneously by a tone and a row of asterisks, at which point they were to respond within 300 ms even if that required guessing. Subjects were informed that the first three lists were practice lists during which no data would be gathered.
Following closely the method of Gronlund and Ratcliff (1989) , each cycle proceeded as follows: First, the words "press the space bar to begin" appeared in the center of the computer screen. When the subject did this, the 30 presentation words appeared in random order at the rate of 3 s each in the center of the screen. After completion of the study phase, the words "press the space bar to begin test" appeared on the screen, and 1 s following the subject's response a test item (target or distractor) was presented in the center of the screen. After a lag of 175, 450, or 750 ms, an 800-Hz tone was sounded for 32 ms and rows of asterisks appeared above and below the test item. This was the signal for the subject to respond. The subject indicated new or old by pressing either the Z key or the question mark and slash key with the left or right index finger. Hand assignments were counterbalanced across subjects. Immediately after the subject responded, the response time was presented on the screen for 500 ms as feedback. This was followed by a blank screen for 250 ms and then the next test. After every block of 12 items, the subject's average response time for that block appeared on the screen for 1,000 ms, and then the words "press the space bar to continue" appeared on the screen. When the bar was pressed, the next block of 12 test trials commenced. After all 60 test trials were completed in this way, the process repeated, beginning with the next presentation list. No feedback regarding accuracy was given.
Results and Discussion
In the analyses of Experiments 3, 4, and 6, the effects of lag were tested using planned-comparison coefficients that were chosen to be linearly related to the sum of the lag and mean reaction time (RT). Because the only constraint on these coefficients was that they sum to zero, mean square errors for tests involving lag are not meaningful and are not reported.
For each subject, the mean and standard deviation of RT were computed in each condition. One subject, whose mean RT at one lag exceeded 400 ms, was eliminated from the analysis, leaving a sample size of 19. As is routinely found in response-signal experiments, mean RTs decreased with increasing lag (317, 214, and 162 ms, respectively), F(2, 36) = 167.2,/? < .001.
In order to minimize the influence of postsignal processing on accuracy, we performed subsequent analyses after eliminating any observation for which the RT was more than 1.5 SDs above the mean for that subject-lag combination (about 6% of the observations). Hit rates, false-alarm rates, and mean RT were then calculated from the remaining observations for each subject in each of the 12 conditions. Mean hit and false-alarm rates are shown as a function of processing time (lag + mean RT) in the top panel of Figure 2 . Compared with HF words, LF words had higher hit rates at the middle and long lags, and lower false alarm rates at all three lags, displaying a mirror effect.
Separate ANOVAs were performed on the hit and falsealarm rates. The effect of word frequency was significant for both, Fs(l, 18) = 8.68 and 45.83, M5 e s = .058 and .020, as was the effect of lag + RT, F(l, 18) = 28.59 and 24.47 (all ps < .01). The interaction between word frequency and lag + RT reached significance on false alarms, F(l, 18) = 6.06, p < .02, but not on hits.
Separate d L values were computed for HF and LF for each subject (see Footnote 1), and the means are shown in the bottom panel of Figure 2 . d L was higher for LF than for HF and increased with lag. An ANOVA showed a reliable effect of word frequency, F(l, 18) = 42.10, MS e = 4.68, and of lag + RT, F(l, 18) = 66.63, ps < .001, but no reliable interaction
, increased across lags, from .60 to .67 to .77. This change was in the wrong direction to support the hypothesis that the mirror effect emerges late in the retrieval episode and may reflect a ceiling effect on recognition of LF words.
Means and standard deviations of C L for the responsesignal experiments are shown in the upper left panel of Figure  3 . Bias was more conservative for LF than for HF words, F{\, 18) = 9.77, MS t = 0.130,/? < .01. C L displayed no reliable main effect of lag or interaction of lag with materials.
These results show that the mirror effect attributable to word frequency can be obtained even very early in the retrieval episode. As defined in terms of differences in both hits and false alarms, the mirror effect was not observed at the shortest lag, but the lack of a reliable change in C L over lags suggests constant (but different) biases for HF and LF words. Contrary to the prediction that false alarms to LF words would be suppressed only late in the retrieval episode, the largest difference in false alarms was obtained at the shortest lag.
Experiment 4
In this experiment we used the response-signal method to study the mirror effect attributable to abstract versus concrete words. In our first attempt we used lags of 175,450, and 750 ms, the same as in Experiment 3. However, it became clear that the mirror effect was not going to emerge because both hit and false-alarm rates were higher for abstract words than for concrete words. Because the mirror effect is commonly obtained using concrete versus abstract words (Glanzer & Adams, 1985) , we thought a longer delay might allow it to appear. We therefore redesigned the experiment, doubling the longest lag. This modified study is reported as Experiment 4.
Method
Sixteen University of Oregon undergraduates participated for $5 each. The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 3, except that the response-signal lags were 175,450, and 1,500 ms. The stimuli were 180 concrete and 180 abstract nouns ranging from 3 to 10 letters in length, sampled from word sets used previously by Glanzer and Adams (1990) . The word sets were the same as those used in Experiment 2.
Results and Discussion
Preliminary trimming of data followed the procedure used for Experiment 3. Mean RTs again decreased with lag (329, 275, and 256 ms), F(2,30) = 45.84,/? < .001.
Mean hit and false-alarm rates are shown in the top panel of Figure 4 . The expected mirror effect was not obtained. As was true in our preliminary data, both hit and false-alarm rates were higher for abstract than for concrete words at the shorter lags. Only at the longest lag did hits for concrete words match those for abstract words. Separate ANOVAs were done on hits and false alarms. The main effect of abstract versus concrete P("old") was significant for hits, F(l, 15) = 6.81, MS e = .071,p < .02, but not for false alarms, F(l, 15) = 3.41, M5 e = .074. The interaction between word type and lag + RT was not reliable for either measure.
d L values are shown in the bottom panel of Figure 4 . By this measure, there was no reliable effect of word type or interaction between word type and lag + RT, but only a main effect of lag + RT, F(\, 15) = 45.45, p < .001. The ratio, d L (abstract)/*//, (concrete), decreased from 1.31 to 1.09 to 0.95 across the three lags. The hypothesis of a late-emerging mirror effect, however, predicts a decrease from near unity to below unity, which was not the pattern obtained. The upper right panel of Figure 3 shows means and standard deviations of the bias measure, C L . Neither word type nor lag nor their interaction had a reliable effect on C L .
This experiment failed to produce a mirror effect or even a CIL difference attributable to concreteness, even though it used word sets that yielded such differences in Experiment 2 and in previous experiments by Glanzer et al. (1991) . Although there was some suggestion of a mirror effect emerging at the longest lag, none of the inferential statistics supported such a conclusion. As was indicated earlier, the mirror effect attributable to concreteness appears to be less robust than that attributable to frequency (Glanzer & Adams, 1985) . Indeed, in their Experiment 1, Glanzer et al. (1991) obtained only a weak concreteness effect. The effect was enhanced in their Experiment 2, possibly because the encoding task required rating words for concreteness. Other evidence supports the view that mirror effects attributable to materials can be modulated by different encoding tasks. Both Hoshino (1991) and Rao and Proctor (1984) argued that a lexical decision encoding task enhances the word-frequency effect because lexical decisions require more processing of LF than of HF words. In an attempt to increase the effect of concreteness on recognition memory in Experiments 5 and 6, we required subjects to rate concreteness during the encoding phase.
Expanded Word Pool
The purpose of Experiments 5 and 6 was to examine the mirror effects attributable to word frequency and to concreteness using the same subjects. In Experiment 5, we used the divided-attention paradigm, and in Experiment 6, we used the response-signal paradigm. These experiments necessitated obtaining a large number of observations per subject for both the frequency and concreteness manipulations without using any word more than once. Because the frequency and concreteness word sets borrowed from Glanzer and Adams (1990) shared several words in common, we had to develop a new and larger word pool. We also took the opportunity to match word sets on extraneous variables over their entire distributions rather than only on their means. Published concreteness ratings are available for a limited number of words (Paivio, Yuille, & Madigan, 1968; Spreen & Schultz, 1966) , so we conducted a concreteness rating study of our own.
Method
We started with the 20,000 words of the Hoosier Mental Lexicon (Nusbaum, Pisoni, & Davis, 1984) , retaining only nouns with mean familiarity ratings of 6-7 on a 7-point scale. Of those remaining, 250 HF and 250 LF words were selected that do not appear in the norms published by Paivio et al. (1968) or Spreen and Schultz (1966) . Kucera and Francis's (1967) frequencies averaged 239 for the HF words and 1 for the LF words. To these were added 50 other words selected at random from the Paivio et al. (1968) norms. The 550 words were divided at random into two lists of 183 words and one of 184, each on a separate form. Subjects rated the words on nine-alternative, electronically scored bubble sheets. Alternatives 1-7 were reserved for the ratings, but subjects had the option of indicating "don't know word" by choosing Alternative 9. As in previous concreteness norming studies, a concrete word was defined as one that "refers to objects, materials or persons" and an abstract word as one that "cannot be experienced by the senses as such." The numerical scale ranged from 1 (concrete) to 7
(abstract).
The subjects were 63 University of Oregon students, participating in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. They were tested in groups. Approximately equal numbers rated each of the three lists.
Results
So that our concreteness ratings could be compared and combined with those of Paivio et al. (1968) and Spreen and Schultz (1966) , who used a scale that ranged from abstract (1) to concrete (7), we reversed the scale by subtracting each mean rating from 8. All subsequent analyses were conducted on these transformed scores. Overall, the words had a mean rated concreteness of 4.68. On average, ratings of HF words (4.09) were lower on this scale than those of LF words (5.17), t (498) = 9.77, p < .001. The correlation of our ratings with those of Paivio et al. (1968) , for the 50 words that overlapped with their study, was .87.
By combining our concreteness ratings with those of Paivio et al. (1968) and Spreen and Schultz (1966) , we were able to select 1,000 words such that there were 250 HF and 250 LF words with distributions matched on both length and concreteness, and there were 250 concrete and 250 abstract words with distributions matched on length and frequency. Descriptive statistics for these 1,000 words, which were used in Experiments 5 and 6, are given in Table 3 . 4 Experiment 5
The purpose of Experiment 5 was to examine the effects of divided attention on the mirror effect attributable to materials, as was done in Experiments 1 and 2. There were two procedural differences between this study and the previous ones: First, the frequency and concreteness effects were examined together in a within-subjects, within-lists design. Second, the encoding task required concreteness ratings rather than lexical decisions.
Method
Subjects. Thirty-six University of Oregon students volunteered for course credit. They were tested individually.
Procedure. Each subject participated in 14 study test cycles within a single session of about 45 min. The first two cycles were practice (single task followed by dual task). During each study list, words were presented for 1.5 s each, and subjects categorized each as either concrete or not concrete by pressing either C or N on the Macintosh keyboard. The interstimulus interval was 0 ms. Subjects were told to respond rapidly while trying to remember the words for a recognition test to follow.
On each recognition test, subjects were told to discriminate between old words (from the immediately preceding concreteness judgment list) and new words. Subjects responded by pressing either the Z or question mark and slash key, with key assignment counterbalanced across subjects. Half of the recognition test lists were accompanied by a secondary task (the dual-task condition) and the other half were done alone (the single-task condition). The task conditions were randomly assigned to cycles for each subject separately, and, in contrast to Experiments 1 and 2, the subjects did not know which test type to expect until the study list was over. Subjects were instructed to respond on the basis of first impressions but to be as quick and accurate as possible. Each stimulus remained on the screen until the subject responded, and then the next word appeared after a 500-ms delay.
Design and materials. Each study list consisted of 20 words-5 HF, 5 LF, 5 concrete, and 5 abstract-and each test list consisted of 40 words, half old and half new. Words were sampled without replacement from the word pool previously described, and all within-lists orderings were random. The two practice lists were of the same length as the experimental lists, but the words were not from the sets described in Table 3 .
Equipment was the same as that used in Experiments 1 and 2. Responses in the concreteness judgment and recognition tasks were made on the Macintosh keyboard, and responses for the listening task were recorded manually. The secondary task used in the dual-task condition was the same as that used in Experiments 1 and 2.
Results
Tables 4 and 5 show a summary of the data. Hit and false-alarm rates displayed the mirror effect, for both the frequency and concreteness variables, under both single-task and dual-task conditions. Separate analyses were done for the frequency and concreteness manipulations.
Frequency. The mean hit rate was higher for LF than for HF words, F(l, 35) = 6.88, MS e = .009,p < .05, and higher for the single-task condition than for the dual-task condition, F(l, 35) = 63.18, MS e = .010, p < .001. The false-alarm rate was lower for LF words than for HF words, F(l, 35) = 36.46, MS e = .009, p < .001, and lower in the single-task condition than in Note. HF = high frequency; LF = low frequency. the dual-task condition, F(\, 35) = 39.62, MS e = .014, p < .001. There was no reliable Frequency x Task interaction on either hits or false alarms.
Similarly, the d L measure showed superiority of LF words, F(l, 35) = 35.00, MS t = 1.00, p < .001, and of the single-task condition, F{\, 35) = 116, MS e = 1.22, p < .001, but no significant Frequency x Task interaction (F < 1). The significance level of the results of pairwise t tests between LF and HF words are indicated by the footnotes in Table 4 . An ANOVA revealed no reliable main effects on C L of word frequency or single versus dual task and no reliable Frequency x Task interaction. The ratio, d L (HF)/d L (LF), was 0.81 in the singletask condition and 0.68 in the dual-task condition. This difference is in the wrong direction to support the hypothesis that the mirror effect is weaker under divided attention.
Concreteness. Hit rates were higher for concrete than for abstract words, F(l, 35) = 14.99, MS e = .008, p < .001, and higher for the single-task than for the dual-task condition, F(l, 35) = 36.38, MS e = 017, p < .001. Likewise, false-alarm rates were lower for concrete words, F(l, 35) = 5.14, MS e = .006, p < .05, and for the single-task condition, F(l, 35) = 43.20, MS t = .016, p < .001. Neither hits nor false alarms showed a reliable Concreteness x Task interaction.
The values for d L showed the superiority of concrete words, F(\, 35) = 18.60, MS e = 1.19,p < .001, and of the single-task condition, F( 1,35) = 106, MS C = 1.38,/? < .001, but no reliable interaction, F(l, 35) = 2.42, MS t = 0.80,p > .10. In contrast to Experiment 2, C L was higher for concrete than for abstract words, FiX, 35) = 9 -03 , MS e = 0.161,p < .01. This difference interacted marginally with divided attention, F(l, 35) = 5.30, MS e = 0.659, p = .027, but single versus dual task had no reliable main effect on Ci-The ratio, rfi(abstract)/rfz.(concrete), was 0.80 in both conditions. The general picture presented by Experiment 5 is of a mirror effect attributable to divided attention and two mirror effects attributable to materials, one shown by HF versus LF words and the other by concrete versus abstract words. The mirror effects attributable to divided attention and to materials are essentially additive or independent.
Experiment 6
In this experiment we extended the response-signal method of Experiments 3 and 4 to test the same subjects using both the frequency and concreteness manipulations. The words were the same as those used Experiment 5, and there were five response-signal lags ranging from 100 to 2,000 ms. The choice of lags was partly motivated by interest in what appeared to be a differential bias to call HF words old at the shortest (175 ms) lag in Experiment 3 and also by a desire to further investigate the possibility of a late-emerging mirror effect for concreteness, as suggested by the results of Experiment 4.
Method
Subjects. Thirty University of Oregon undergraduates participated. They were tested individually in two 1-hr sessions, for which they received $10. Data were discarded for 2 subjects who had more than 20% of RTs greater than 350 ms at one or more lags and for a 3rd subject who failed to return for the second session.
Materials and design. The stimuli were the 1,000 words described in Table 3 . The overall design of the presentation and test lists was the same as that of Experiment 5, except that in each test list, one randomly selected word of each of the eight types (old vs. new) x (HF, LF, concrete, or abstract) was tested at each of five lags. In the first session, there were two practice cycles followed by 12 experimental cycles. In the second session, there was one practice cycle followed by 13 experimental cycles. Thus, each subject contributed 25 potential observations to each of the eight conditions.
Procedure. The procedure, including training and feedback, closely followed that used in Experiments 3 and 4. However, the encoding task was the concreteness judgment task used in Experiment 5. The five lags were 100,250,500, 1,000, and 2,000 ms.
Results
Data. Mean RTs decreased from the shortest to the longest lag (254, 225, 197, 192, and 191 ms, respectively) , F(l, 26) = 160,/? < .001. In subsequent analyses, all observations with RTs exceeding 350 ms were excluded.
Mean hit and false-alarm rates are plotted separately for the frequency and concreteness manipulations in Figure 5 . Both manipulations produced a mirror effect. Separate contrasts were done on hit rates and false-alarm rates for the frequency and the concreteness manipulations (M5 e = .006 for all comparisons). LF words had higher hit rates and lower false-alarm rates than did HF words, Fs(l, 104) = 11.88 and 51.46, ps < .001, respectively. Concrete words had higher hit rates and slightly lower false-alarm rates than did abstract words, Fs(l, 104) = 23.27 and 3.94,ps < .001 and .05, respectively.
The data points in Figure 6 show how d L for the four word types varied as a function of processing time. Performance was better on LF than on HF words, F(l, 104) = 99.31, MS e = 0.64, p < .001, and better on concrete than on abstract words, F(l, 104) = 33.91, MS e = 0.64, p < .001. The frequency effect was reliably greater than the concreteness effect, F(l, 26) = 6.16, MS e = 0.89, p < .02.
The bottom panel of Figure 3 shows means and standard deviations of C/. for the four word types at each of the five lags. Bias was more conservative for LF words than for HF words, F(l, 104) = 9.21, MS? = 0.145,p < .01, replicating a result of Experiment 3. Bias was also more conservative for abstract words than for concrete words, F(l, 104) = 5.56, MS e = 0.145, p < .05, an effect not observed in Experiment 4. As in both previous experiments, C L displayed no reliable main effect of lag or interaction of lag with either frequency or concreteness.
Curve fitting. In order to compare the retrieval dynamics of the different conditions, we fitted d L values with an exponential function that is known to closely describe response-signal discriminability curves (Dosher, 1981 (Dosher, , 1984a Wickelgren & Corbett, 1977) :
( 1) and d = 0 otherwise. Here, A is the asymptote, R is the rate of approach to asymptote, / is the intercept, and t is lag + RT. Fits were evaluated by the proportion of variance accounted for, adjusted for the number of free parameters:
P("old") P("old") 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Lag + RT (ms) Figure 5 . Results of Experiment 6. The top panel represents the probability (P) of responding "old" to old and new high-frequency (HF) and low-frequency (LF) words; the bottom panel represents the probability of responding to old and new concrete and abstract words as a function of processing time. Con = concrete; Abs = abstract; RT = reaction time. where N is the number of data points (d t ), d t is the value predicted by Equation 1, k is the number of free parameters, and d is the overall mean (Reed, 1976) . Data fitting was done by a procedure implemented in Microsoft Excel Solver, which iteratively adjusted parameters to maximize the value of the variance accounted for (r 2 ). Four different models, which differed in the number of free parameters, were fitted to the 20 (5 lags x 4 word types) data points, d t . The most constrained model (6 parameters: 11,1 R, and 4 A) allowed different asymptotes for each of the four curves but just one intercept and one rate, and the least constrained model (12 parameters: 41,4 R, and 4 A) allowed a different value of each parameter for every curve. There were also two 9-parameter models (1 I, 4 R, and 4 A and 4 I, 1 R, and 4 A). Fits were done to individual subjects' d L values and also to overall mean d L . In all cases, the most constrained model was fitted first, and its final parameters were used as starting values for the less constrained models in order to avoid local minima. Table 6 shows the best fits of the 12-parameter and 6-parameter models. For the individual fits, the means are shown (harmonic means in the case of R).
5 The individual-subjects parameter estimates for the 12-parameter model were submitted to three separate one-way ANOVAs. There were no reliable differences among conditions in intercepts, F(3, 78) = 0.90, MS e = 0.011, or in inverses of rates, F(3, 78) = 1.10, M5 e = 0.134, but asymptotes were significantly different, F(3, 78) = 14.86, MS e = 1.03, p < .001. On average, the fits were best for the most constrained (6-parameter) model (mean r 2 = .88) and worst for the least constrained (12-parameter) model (mean r 2 = .84). The fits of all four models to the overall means were excellent and differed only in the fourth decimal, r 2 = .996. The fit of the 6-parameter model to the mean data is shown in Figure 6 . 
Discussion
The fit of the 6-parameter model to the d L curves suggests that the mirror effects attributable to concreteness and frequency have the same retrieval dynamics. There is no indication that intercepts or rates differ among conditions, despite the hint that they might in the data of Experiment 4. Moreover, the mirror effects attributable to both variables appeared at the earliest point in the retrieval episode where performance was detectably above chance. Neither hits and false alarms (see Figure 5 ), discriminability (see Figure 6 ), nor bias (see Figure 3 ) suggest a late-emerging cause or component of the mirror effect.
The constancy over lags of the bias measure, C L , is interesting because it shows that the mirror effects attributable to frequency and concreteness are superimposed on a mirror effect attributable to lag. That is, hit rates and false-alarm rates were both about 0.5 for all word types at the shortest lag, and they steadily moved apart with increasing processing time. Because hits and false alarms for the different word types approach their respective asymptotes at about the same rate, word type and lag produce nested, or additive, mirror effects.
General Discussion
These experiments were done to test the hypothesis, suggested by the work of Brown et al. (1977) , that the mirror effect in recognition memory reflects a conscious, postretrieval judgment of the memorabilities of test items. The results provide no consistent support for that hypothesis. Opportunities for conscious reflection were constrained at retrieval by dividing attention and by limiting processing time, but neither manipulation attenuated the mirror effect. If the mirror effect is not altered by such retrieval constraints, it may best be attributed to the inherent nature of the retrieval and judgment processes that underlie recognition memory.
It is noteworthy that our retrieval constraints reliably affected discriminability, but not bias. In none of the experiments was there a reliable main effect of either divided attention or processing time on C L , and those interactions that were significant in individual experiments did not replicate.
We also found that individual subject's biases tended to be correlated across conditions. For example, the correlation in C L between single-and dual-task conditions in Experiments 1, 2, and 5 averaged .61. In the response-signal paradigm, correlations in C L across lags ranged from .38 (shortest vs. longest lag in Experiment 3) to .90 (shortest vs. next shortest lag in Experiment 6). The general pattern was for correlations to be highest when lags were the closest together and lowest when lags were the farthest apart. Correlations in C L between word categories but within constraint conditions averaged .70 in the divided-attention experiments and .65 in the responsesignal experiments. These correlations imply that the large standard deviations in C L reported for all of our experiments are not just sampling error but indicate sizable and consistent differences among subjects in response bias. In general, the analyses of C L lead to two conclusions: (a) Response bias is remarkably resistant to influence by either capacity constraints or time constraints on retrieval, (b) Individual subjects show considerable variability in response bias.
Current models of recognition memory have difficulty accounting for mirror effects in general; however, the insensitivity of response bias to manipulations of processing time would seem to pose a special problem. In a standard signal-detection view of recognition memory, new and old items have overlapping distributions on a strength or familiarity dimension. Responses of old and new depend on whether the familiarity of the test item is above or below an established criterion value. In such a framework it seems natural to suppose that retrieved strengths increase as a function processing time or lag (Wickelgren, 1976) . New-item strengths could remain constant or increase with lag, but if they increase, old-item strengths must increase faster in order to explain the increase in d L . In either case, if the response criterion has a fixed value on the strength axis, then there should be a general increase in the proportion of old responses-and thus a decrease of CL-with increasing lag. For bias to remain roughly constant, as it did here, the response criterion would have to dynamically track the rapidly changing locations of the old and new distributions in order to maintain the same relative position in between.
It may be possible to modify the signal-detection view to explain the constancy of bias; however, a somewhat different approach may be called for that directly addresses the dynamics, and not just the terminal state, of the retrieval and decision processes that underlie recognition performance. One hint of what may be going on can be found in a "micro trade-off' analysis of the response-signal experiments. The standard analysis exemplified by Figure 6 examines the relationship between accuracy and lag + RT, the latter of which is primarily determined by lag. Micro trade-off functions, by contrast, examine the relationship between accuracy and RT within lags. Within-lag performance could vary with RT if subjects sometimes delay responding slightly in order to gain processing time and accuracy. Alternatively, accuracy could remain stable or even decrease with RT. Plots of micro trade-off functions, relating accuracy to RT, can be useful for distinguishing between processing models (Pachella, 1974) . We examined micro trade-off functions by dividing each subject's RT distribution in each condition into thirds (after excluding RTs longer than 350 ms) and computing d L separately for each third. Because the data for the different word types looked about the same, we averaged them together. In Figure 7 , a 3-point micro trade-off function, showing accuracy in successive thirds of the RT distribution, is presented at each lag for each of Experiments 3,4, and 6.
The three sets of data present a consistent picture: Subjects gained in accuracy by delaying responding when lag + RT was under about 700 ms, but at longer lags the accuracy functions decreased. To determine whether this change in trend was reliable, we conducted 3 (lags) x 3 (thirds) ANOVAs on the data from Experiments 3 and 4, and we ran a similar 5x3 ANOVA on Experiment 6. All three analyses yielded reliable interactions, F(4, 72) = 5.68, F(4, 60) = 5.16, and F(8,152) = 3.65, respectively (ps < .001). Micro trade-off functions that decreased at longer lags were also observed by Corbett and Wickelgren (1978) in a response-signal study of semanticmemory verification times, suggesting that our results are generally characteristic of the response-signal method. We know of no other published data, however, showing that the trend changes direction with increasing lag, as is revealed by Figure 7 .
The increasing micro trade-offs at short lags are as expected if subjects are trading processing time for accuracy. We suspect that the decreasing functions found at medium and long lags reflect variability in the difficulty of the decision: On some trials, the subject is able to make a decision and prepare a response before the signal, and so the RT is short and the decision relatively accurate. On other trials, the signal occurs while the subject is still trying to decide. The switch of attention from evaluation to response execution results in a relatively late but low-accuracy response, possibly just a random guess. This suggests that the dynamics of recognition memory in general and the mirror effect in particular might be modeled by a random-walk process that accumulates evidence toward either a positive or a negative decision threshold over time (e.g., Link, 1992) . Ratcliff (1978) illustrated one way in which random-walk processes can be applied to recognition memory, including response-signal data. Without modification, however, Ratcliffs model does not predict a mirror effect attributable to word frequency or concreteness. It is not clear whether any of the existing models of the mirror effect can be modified to deal with the data reported here. As was mentioned earlier, the most promising attempts to account for the mirror effect have been models assuming that familiarity is rescaled prior to the recognition decision. In such rescaling models, memorability is taken into account automatically rather than deliberately, as suggested by Brown et al. (1977) . The mirror effect arises because the rescaling parameters are different for different classes of items. Obviously, the viability of a particular rescaling model depends not only on its exact predictions but also on the plausibility and completeness of the mechanism that is proposed. Gillund and Shiffrin (1984) suggested a rescaling scheme similar to the computation of z scores, in which the familiarity of a test item of a particular class (e.g., HF vs. LF) is scaled against the estimated mean and standard deviation for new items of that class. This approach seems awkward in several respects (for elaboration, see Hintzman, 1988, p. 542) . In particular, new-distribution parameters are assumed to be estimated during the study list, but there is no account of why subjects would classify words during study into such arbitrary and nonintuitive categories as HF, LF, concrete, and abstract. Gillund and Shiffrin's (1984) attempt does, however, make the fruitful suggestion that rescaling and criterion placement may be based on estimates of properties of the appropriate old and new distributions.
Another approach, attention-likelihood theory, assumes that familiarities are rescaled as log likelihood ratios (Glanzer & Adams, 1990) . The likelihood ratio for a particular familiarity value, x, is the height of the appropriate old-item distribution divided by the height of the corresponding new-item distribution at the abscissa value of x. The likelihood ratio is 1 (thus, the log of the ratio is 0) at the point where the new and old distributions cross. Transforming retrieved familiarities into log likelihood ratios has the effect of lining up corresponding pairs of old and new distributions at their crossing points. This approach requires that the subject know, or be able to quickly estimate, the entirety of each old and new distribution at test and so implies an even bigger processing burden than does z-score rescaling. Glanzer and Adams (1990) suggested no mechanism for doing the rescaling. Their Equation 2 reorders familiarity distributions so as to yield a prototypical mirror effect, but only because it is mathematically derived from the learning and retention assumptions of their memory model; thus, it automatically "knows" what the true distributions are (see also Glanzer et al., 1991; Kim & Glanzer, 1993) . As such, attention-likelihood theory not only lacks a rescaling mechanism, but it appears incapable of explaining why the mirror effect sometimes fails to fit the prototypical pattern of equal bias (e.g., our Experiments 1 and 2) and sometimes is not found at all (e.g., our Experiment 4; see also Hoshino, 1991; Wixted, 1992) . Hintzman (1994) proposed that rescaling could be based in part on information generated by learning the test item on the test trial: First, the familiarity of the test item is retrieved; second, the item is learned according to its characteristic learning rate; and third, its familiarity is retrieved again. The increment in familiarity (postlearning minus prelearning) can serve as an estimate of the increment the same item would have produced if it had been encountered in the study list. Thus, rescaling can be item specific and not require summary statistics or complete knowledge of familiarity distributions for arbitrary word classes. The exact implementation of this idea depends on which memory model it is attached to, but simulations show that it is sufficient to produce a mirror effect (Hintzman, 1994) . Unfortunately, we have not been able to turn test-trial increment rescaling into a plausible account of recognition retrieval dynamics, as exemplified by Experiment 6. The problem is that the familiarity increment must be computed before rescaling can begin, and it is difficult to imagine that six successive stages-perceptual registration, an initial retrieval, learning of the test item, a second retrieval, rescaling, and response execution-could occur in less than 500 ms. Indeed, little learning seems to occur when the study time is brief (e.g., Yonelinas, Hockley, & Murdock, 1992) .
We conclude that no extant rescaling model offers a satisfactory explanation of our data. Nevertheless, we feel that the key to understanding these and other mirror-effect data must lie in understanding the determinants of response bias and that this understanding must derive from a general theory of the recognition-decision process. Such a theory should explain not only the pattern of hits and false alarms that constitutes the mirror effect, but also why that pattern is obtained in some circumstances and not in others.
